Control buyouts of healthcare services and health-technology businesses. Nothing else, in seventeen years. Seven platforms, built by acquisition around an operating spine we staff ourselves.
| Platform | Therapeutic area | Stage | Sites | States | EBITDA | Add-ons | Compliance | RCM | Clinical | M&A |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Northbridge Partnersacquired 2018 | Behavioral health · 61 outpatient, 33 intensive-outpatient | Harvesting | 94 | 7 | $38M | 31 | ||||
| Kestrel Healthacquired 2019 | Musculoskeletal · ASC-led, 14 sub-specialties | Scaling | 61 | 5 | $52M | 27 | ||||
| Cedarmooracquired 2020 | Post-acute · home health, hospice, palliative | Scaling | 77 | 9 | $41M | 34 | ||||
| Lumen Groupacquired 2021 | Laboratory · anatomic pathology and clinical chemistry | Re-platforming | 38 | 4 | $29M | 18 | ||||
| Harbor Rowacquired 2022 | Dental · general, endodontics, orthodontics | Scaling | 106 | 6 | $33M | 41 | ||||
| Silverlake Clinicsacquired 2024 | Women’s health · OB-GYN and fertility | Integrating | 29 | 3 | $17M | 11 | ||||
| Ardenwayacquired 2025 | Health technology · revenue-cycle software | Platform year one | 7 | 2 | $12M | 6 | ||||
| Seven platforms | Seven distinct therapeutic areas | — | 412 | 19† | $222M | 168 | † distinct states — the column sums to 36 because platforms overlap | |||
Every generalist fund that has lost money in healthcare lost it the same way. Not on the growth rate — on a billing practice that was compliant in one state and not in another, on a payor contract that reset three months after close, on a physician compensation model that could not survive being renegotiated.
Those are not tail risks. They are the ordinary operating reality of the sector, and the only defence against them is having seen them before. We have run a corporate integrity agreement to completion. We have taken two platforms through a payor termination and out the other side. We have rebuilt a revenue cycle that was eleven months behind.
So we do not diligence a healthcare business the way a generalist does. The clinical quality review happens before the quality of earnings, because a platform with a bad outcomes profile is not cheap — it is unbuyable. Our chief medical officer sees every deal in week one, and has killed four of the last nineteen.
“A generalist could learn every bit of this. It would cost them roughly four hundred million dollars, which is about what it cost us.”Dr. Amara Osei-Lindqvist · Chief Medical Officer
You will talk to the same two people from the first call to the second anniversary. We will tell you in the first meeting what changes for your clinicians and what does not, and we will put it in the letter of intent rather than leaving it as a promise. Sellers roll alongside us in every deal, which is the only guarantee that actually means anything.
Start a conversationIndication in ten business days. Clinical review inside three weeks. We have not re-traded a signed letter of intent on a regulatory finding since 2016.
